or understandable, as when we explain an
event by showing why or how it occurred. Just
about anything can be the object of explanation:
a concept, a rule, the meaning of a word, the
point of a chess move, the structure of a novel.
However, there are two sorts of things whose
explanation has been intensively discussed in
philosophy: events and human actions.
Individual events, say the collapse of a bridge,
are usually explained by specifying their cause:
the bridge collapsed because of the pressure of
the flood water and its weakened structure. This
is an example of causal explanation. There usually
are indefinitely many causal factors responsible
for the occurrence of an event, and the
choice of a particular factor as “the cause”
appears to depend primarily on contextual considerations.
Thus, one explanation of an automobile
accident may cite the icy road condition;
another the inexperienced driver; and still
another the defective brakes. Context may determine
which of these and other possible explanations
is the appropriate one. These explanations
of why an event occurred are sometimes contrasted
with explanations of how an event
occurred. A “how” explanation of an event consists
in an informative description of the process
that has led to the occurrence of the event, and
such descriptions are likely to involve descriptions
of causal processes.
The covering law model is an influential attempt
to represent the general form of such explanations:
an explanation of an event consists in “subsuming,”
or “covering,” it under a law. When the
covering law is deterministic, the explanation is
thought to take the form of a deductive argument:
a statement – the explanandum – describing
the event to be explained is logically derived
from the explanans – the law together with statements
of antecedent conditions. Thus, we might
explain why a given rod expanded by offering
this argument: ‘All metals expand when heated;
this rod is metallic and it was heated; therefore, it
expanded’. Such an explanation is called a deductive-
nomological explanation. On the other hand,
probabilistic or statistical laws are thought to
yield statistical explanations of individual events.
Thus, the explanation of the contraction of a contagious
disease on the basis of exposure to a
patient with the disease may take the form of a
statistical explanation. Details of the statistical
model have been a matter of much controversy.
It is sometimes claimed that although explanations,
whether in ordinary life or in the sciences,
seldom conform fully to the covering law model,
the model nevertheless represents an ideal that
all explanations must strive to attain. The covering
law model, though influential, is not universally
accepted.
Human actions are often explained by being
“rationalized’ – i.e., by citing the agent’s beliefs
and desires (and other “intentional” mental
states such as emotions, hopes, and expectations)
that constitute a reason for doing what
was done. You opened the window because you
wanted some fresh air and believed that by opening
the window you could secure this result. It
has been a controversial issue whether such
rationalizing explanations are causal; i.e.,
whether they invoke beliefs and desires as a
cause of the action. Another issue is whether
these “rationalizing” explanations must conform
to the covering law model, and if so, what laws
might underwrite such explanations.
Keyword Search:
CAUSATION,
COVERING LAW MODEL,
PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE
0 komentar:
Posting Komentar